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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
was directed at proper punishment of a prior offender, where there
was no knowledge of the prior offense at the time of the trial. 12
The practice presently allowed prejudices the jury against the
defendant, without serving any useful function. The knowledge
of a prior conviction is necessary only after the conviction and then
merely to enable the trial judge to impose the proper punishment.
If the court does not see fit to eliminate this prejudicial practice
the legislature should act.
At The Trial
a. EvidentiaryRuling: The evidence allowed or denied admission at a tinal is in many cases the determining factor in defendant's acquittal or conviction. His right to a fair trial is protected against prejudicial error by the appellate court's careful
scrutiny of the evidentiary rulings objected to. Such a decision,
however, is usually of little precedent value.
In People v. Feld,13 the trial court admitted into evidence
imperfect recordings of a telephone conversation1 4 incriminating
defendant. The recording was marred by many interruptions
and contained defendant's name only once. The defendant contended that the recordings were mutilated or fabrications, and
tried to introduce testimony by a wire tap expert to this effect.
This testimony was denied admission, after evidence was admitted
to the effect that the expert could not tell if the records were
duplicates. or originals.
The Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision, ruled that failure to
allow defendant a chance to disprove the authenticity of the recordings was not prejudicial error. Since the expert had already stated
he could not tell if the recording were originals or duplicates his
further testimony would have been valueless.
The dissent vigorously claims that the destruction of the authenticity of the recordings would have gone a long way in destroying the People's case and failure to admit testimony on this
vital question should compel reversal and a new trial.
b. Testimom.y of Previous Identification: At common law it
was a well settled rule that an identification by a witness, of a
defendant at a trial, could not be further supported by testimony
12. See N. Y. Lacrs. Doc. No. 84 at 22 (1926).
13. 305 N. Y. 322 113 N. E. 2d 440 (1953).
14. CoDE Cam!. Paoc. § 813(a). The wire taps were made pursuant to an order

of the court.
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that the witness had previously made a similar identification.15
The rationale for this rule lies in the belief that repetitive testimony to the effect that defendant had been previously identified
has no probative value in proving defendant's identity, but is likely
to influence a jury on that issue.
The legislature has provided in § 393-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure for "Testimony of Previous Identification. When
identification of any person is in issue, a witness who has on a
previous occasion identified such person may testify to such previous identification." A recent case1" decided by the Court of Appeals interpreted this section to be an exception to the common law
prohibition, insofar as the person who made the previous identification may testify thereto at the trial as a means of substantive
proof of identification.
7 raised the
On appeal the defendant in People v. TrowbridgeU
s
question of whether other persons may testify to a previous
identification by the identifying witness. All the judges concluded
that such testimony by other persons was inadmissible, since the
legislative exception to the general prohibition at common law, is
expressly limited to the person who made the previous identification. The majority believed that due to the nature of the case,
the allowance of the inadmissable testimony was reversible error.
The dissent disagreed on this point.

The legislative provision 9 follows a theory contra to the common law belief, to the effect that testimony to a previous identification, usually made close, in point of time, to the crime carries
considerable evidentiary force.?° In a few instances 2 this theory
has been mentioned for the basis of going one step further, and
allowing others to testify to the previous identification on the basis
that such testimony is primary evidence to show that a previous
identification had been made. The decision in the instant case
reaffirms the New York stand as to the merit of the common law
rule. This indicates that the court will limit testimony of previous
identification to that of the identifying witness and no others.
15. People v. Jung Hing, 212 N. Y. 393. 106 N. E. 105 (1914) ; This rule was
subject to exceptions where testimony was permissible as proof of credibility of the
witness, not substantive or affirmative proof of identity, after the witness had been discredited or impeached.
16. People v. Spinello. 303 N. Y. 193, 101 N. E. 2d 457 (1951).
17. 305 N. Y. 471, 113 N. E. 2d 841 (1953).
18. E. g., a detective or clerk present at the tlme of identification.
19. CODE CMI. PROC. § 393 (b) (quoted in text).
20. 4 WGmoRE, EvIDmEcE § 1130 (3d ed. 1940).

21. Ibid; see DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925) (concurring
opinion).
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c. Coerced Confessions: In People v. Leyra,2 the defendant
had been previously tried and found guilty of murder.2 The Court
of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial on the ground that
defendant's confession to a doctor summoned by the District Attorney's office, was obtained by mental coercion and therefore inadmissible. 2 The court did not rule on the validity of three subsequent confessions, but instructed that these should be a jury
question, considered in the light of whether the mental coercion,
and a promise of leniency also contended to have been made by
the doctor, had influenced the defendant.2 5
At the second trial the Judge stated as a part of his charge
"that as a matter of law a promise of leniency had been made by
the doctor."' The defendant contended that under this charge
which becomes the "law of the case" the subsequent confessions
were inadmissible and no longer a jury question.
Three of the four members of the Court of Appeals who
voted to affirm the conviction, held that even after the finding of
a promise as a matter of law, it still remained a jury question
to decide if this promise and the mental coercion had induced the
defendant to make his subsequent confessions. The fourth member of the court affirmed the conviction under § 542 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure 2 without indicating any one "technical
error."
A strongly worded dissent concluded' that once the promise
was charged, as a matter of law, to have been used in inducing the
previously ddclared invalid confession, the subsequent confessions
to the police and assistant district attorneys, just two hours later,
must be deemed to have been induced by the same promise and
therefore inadmissible. Instructing the jury they might find
otherwise was opposed to logic and incompatible with the "law of
the case".
Another issue raised was the propriety of admitting the original coerced confession into evidence at the second trial. This
was held to be proper, upon finding that the confession was introduced only for consideration in determining whether the sub22. 304 N. Y. 468, 108 N. E. 2d 673 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 918 (1953),
rehearing denied, 345 U. S. 946 (1953).
23. People v. Leyra, 302 N. Y. 353, 98 N. E. 2d 553 (1951).
24. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; N. Y. CODE CTM. PRoc. § 395.
25. See Lyons v. State of Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1943) ; Malinski v. People
of State of New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1944) ; Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156
(1953).
26. "After hearing the appeal, the court must give judgments, without regard to
technical errors or defects to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.!
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sequent confessions were coerced and that the jury had been effectively instructed that the first confession was not to be considered
on the issue of guilt-"
in this case are in
The decisions on the two issues involved
28 However, there is a
standards.
line with present due process
pregnant danger in stating that coercive -confessions are invalid,
but subsequent confessions are not, depending on a jury determination of continuing influence. This may encourage law enforcement officials to obtain confessions by means of coercion and
inducement, with the hope that subsequent confessions obtained
before the influence has sufficiently worn off, may be permitted
into evidence.
d. Misconduct of Jurors: The defendant in People v. Cocco was convicted of grand larceny. At the trial, the defendant
had put his character in issue by being sworn in as a witness on
his own behalf. After the case had been submitted to the jury for
deliberation, one of the alternate jurors who had been discharged
at the end of the trial met and informed one of the women jurors,
as she was proceeding to dinner with the other members of the
jury, that Cocco ran a "sporting house". After the verdict the
informed juror made an affidavit stating she had not at anytime
mentioned this conversation to the other jurors.
29

trial 80 was denied by the trial
Defendant's motion for a new
3 1 On appeal, the majority and
court and the Appellate Division.
dissent agreed that the informed juror had done no wrong but that
the discharged alternate juror had.
The majority reversed and granted a new trial, finding that
they could not say that the information given the juror, at the
time the jury Was deliberating the issues of fact, including the
defendant's character, did not prejudice the defendant's substan-

tial rights.

The dissent reasoned that the misconduct had not been shown
to have any influence on any jurors, so-no substantial right of the
defendant had been prejudiced.
This case -is another illustration of the court striving to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial where it is difficult to ascertain the seriousness of the error committed.
27. See Malnski v. People of State of New York, supra note 25.
28. See note 25 supra; 19 BRooKxLY L. REv. 316 (1953); 3 Bso. L. Rxv. 146
(1953).
29. 305 N. Y. 282, 113 N. E. 2d 422 (1953).
30. CoDE CRmd PRoc. § 465 (3) (misconduct of jurors).

31. People p. Cocco, 280 App. Div. 960, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (4th Dep't 1952).
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e. Charge: In People v. Lupo, 82 the defendant was found
guilty on all counts for which he was indicted. On appeal the defendant contended that the judge's charge was inadequate, in that
it failed to clearly point out to the understanding of the jurors all
the necessary elements of each crime and the possible verdicts.
The conviction was unanimously reversed and a new trial ordered,
upon finding that repeated questioning by the jurors directed at
clarification of the charge failed, thereby leaving the jurors without a clear understanding of the questions presented. The judge's
charge, a means of guiding laymen in carrying out their important responsibility, must be something more than 'a collection of
accurate statements of the law; it must present clearly to the jury
the issues involved or it will be deemed inadequate.
f. Conviction under Wrong Statute: In People v. Costello,a3
there was a conviction for damaging a tire on an automobile, under one of the so called "catch-all" sections of the Penal Law 4
'which provides punishment for injury to personal property where
it is not otherwise specifically prescribed. On appeal the conviction was reversed and the information dismissed upon a finding
that a Penal Law Section 5 expressly provides for punishment
of defendant's act. The court coficluded that the provision under
which defendant was convicted was not applicable since by its
terms it was intended to cover situations not provided for by any
other penal section..
g. Imposition bf .entence: In Hogan v.. Bohan," the District Attorney obtained an order under C.P.A. § 1283 T directing
T"udge Bohan to pronounce sentence upon a defendant. The necessity for the order arose when -the defendant was found guilty of
a felony, committed while on parole, thereby
subjecting himself to
'§ 219 of the Correction Law,38 which requires defendant to serve
the balance of his previous unexpired prison term before beginning his new sentence. To avoid this seemingly harsh treatment,
the judge deferred defendant's sentence on the assumption defendant might thus avoid being subjected to this section. 39 This case
32. 305 N. Y. 448, 113 N. E. 2d 793 (1953).
33. 304 N. Y. 63, 110 N. E. 2d 880 (1953).
34. PENAL LAw § 1433 (2).
35. PAx LAw § 1425 (lia).
36. 305 N. Y. 110, 111 N. E. 2d 233 (1953).
37. Provides for relief by means of obtaining an order compelling performance
of a duty just as a writ of mandamus did at common law.
38. ComRCToN LAW §219; recites that, if any prisoner is "convicted in this
state of a felony committed while on parole . . . he shall, in addition
the sentence
which may be imposed for such felony, and before beginning to serve tosuch
be compelled to serve in state's prison the portion remaining of the maximum sentence,
of
the sentence on which he was released on parole from the time of such release onterm
parole
until the expiration."
39. Ibid.
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states the self-evident proposition that following an adjudication
of guilt, judgment must be imposed and may not be deferred or.
postponed indefinitely.'
Right of Appeal
It is a well established rule that appeal is not a matter of
criminal cases an appeal
constitutional right, and in non-capital
41 In the case of In re Ryan,4 2
lies only by statutory authorization.
petitioner's motion to dismiss four subpoenas duces tecum returnable before the Grand Jury was denied by the4 3Court of GenerThe Code of
al Sessions, which had only criminal jurisdiction.
Criminal Procedure44 makes no provision for the review of an
order denying a motion to vacate a subpoena. 5
The petitioner appealed under C.P.A. § 631 (2)." The Appellate Division held4 7 that the order was appealable under this
C.P.A. section but upon reviewing the merits, refused to vacate
all the subpoenas.
The Court of Appeals in reviewing, after cross appeals, denied the petitioner any standing to appeal under the C. P. A. and
thereby refused to review the merits of the case. The Court stated
that the C. P. A. applies only to civil actions and civil proceedings except where otherwise specified. The petitioner chose to
proceed in a court which had only criminal jurisdiction, in a
matter somewhat related to criminal law, and thereby is deemed
to have instituted a criminal proceeding, where the right to
appeal is regulated by criminal procedure.
It is implied that the petitioner could have instituted his
motion to dismiss the subpoena in a court of both civil and criminal
jurisdiction, and by so doing may have been able to appeal under
the applicable C. P. A. sections. The rule, though unclear, would
seem to be that the right of appeal on a proceeding either civil or
of the court in
criminal in nature is dependent on the jurisdiction
which the proceeding is originally brought. 8
40. The judge must pronounce judgment, either -to sentence defendant to a term
in prison or to suspend sentence, or to impose a sentence and suspend its execution.

41. People v. Reed, 276 N. Y. 5, 11 N. E. 2d 330 (1937) ; People v. Zerillo, 200
N. Y. 443. 93 N. E. 1108 (1911).
42. 306 N. Y. 11. 114 N. E. 2d 183 (1953).
43. CODE CRU. FRoc. § 51; People ex rel Jerome v. Court of General Sessions,
185 N. Y. 504, 78 N. E. 149 (1906).

44. CoDE Cm. PRoc. § 517-52-0.
45. Matter of Turecamo Contracting Co., 260 App. Div. 253. 21 N. Y. S. 2d 270
(2d Dep't 1940).
46. An appeal may be taken in special, proceedings: "From an order, affecting

a substantial right, made by a court of record possessing original jurisdiciton, or a
judge thereof in a special proceeding instituted in that court . . ."

47. In re Ryan, 281 App. Div. 953. 120 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (1st Dep't 1953).
48. See Matter of Clan-si, 296 N. Y. 354, 73 N. E. 2d 548 (1947).

